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ORDERS IN THE CONDUCT OF CLASS ACTIONS:
A CONSIDERATION OF SUBDIVISION (d)
HERBERT B. NEWBERG *
Mr. Newberg discusses actions maintainable under amended
Rule 23(b) (3) and the court's powers to issue orders under
subsection (d). He examines the necessity, desirability and
practicability of a member's intervention or appearance
through counsel. With regard to settlements, the argument is
made that the possibility of immediate settlement among the
original parties should properly influence the determination
whether the class action is the superior method of resolving
the controversy. Similarly, the relationship of settlement to
notice requirements is examined. A persistent theme of the dis-
cussion is the tension underlying the judicial effort to keep
the class action manageable but not exclusive of members
properly party to the litigation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Once the court has upheld the validity of a Rule 23 class action, a
full arsenal of adaptable methods is available to assure the fair and
efficient conduct of the action.' Rule 23 (d), which sets forth various
provisions for the making of appropriate orders in the course of a class
action, restates the traditional powers of the court under prior law,
although they were not spelled out in Rule 23 prior to the 1966 amend-
ments. The catalogue of possible orders contained in Rule 23(d) is not
exhaustive, as Rule 23(d) (5) leaves open the opportunity for orders
"dealing with similar procedural matters." Further, the last sentence
of Rule 23(d) provides that such orders may be combined with pretrial
orders under Rule 16.
Radical departures were inaugurated by the 1966 amendments to
Rule 23. Time-honored concepts of true, hybrid and spurious types of
class actions were discarded. Gone also are the similarities which
existed between a spurious class action under former Rule 23 (a) (3)
and the permissive joinder devices under Rule 24 (b) .2 No longer may
a party interested in a class action abstain from binding membership
in the class until he learns of the final judgment and then intervene
* B.S., Economics, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1958; LL.B.,
Harvard Law School, 1961; Member, Pennsylvania and Federal Bars; Assistant City
Solicitor of the City of Philadelphia, I963-64; Member of the firm of Cohen, Shapiro,
Berger, Polisher & Cohen, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
I Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d),
2 Lipsett v. United States, 359 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1966) ; Nagler v. Admiral Corp.,
248 F.2d 319, 327 (2d Cir. 1957).
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only in the event that the judgment is in his favor. Such "one way in-
tervention" has been virtually eliminated under the new Rule.'
Today, Rule 23 is a practically oriented procedure prescribing the
occasions for maintaining class actions and directing their course.' New
Rule 23(b) (3) 8 represents a high-water mark in the ability of the
courts, in appropriate cases, to dispense justice to large numbers of
claimants and to reduce the multiplicity of actions which otherwise
might confront the same defendants and confound solutions to court
backlog problems. Amended Rule 23(0(2) 6 provides that all class
actions maintained to the end as such will result in judgments includ-
ing those whom the court finds to be members of the class, whether
or not the judgment is favorable to the class. This provision represents
a complete procedural about-face from former Rule 23 provisions and
precedents thereunder.' The opportunities provided by a class action,
both for judicial economy and for affording large numbers of small
claimants a day in court, has led the Tenth Circuit to rule that in a
doubtful case any error should be committed in favor of allowing the
class action, since it is within the power of the court at a later time to
limit either the issues or the parties. 8
In the context of these sweeping innovations, the application of
traditional judicial powers to control litigation of greatly increased
dimensions poses many difficult and novel questions. For example, the
court must consider the best method of coping with the potentially vast
pretrial and trial aspects of a class action which may involve thousands
of claimants spread throughout the United States. Questions such as
the roles and obligations of counsel to represent parties as compared
to the members of the class must be determined. Under the new Rule,
the courts will face novel issues: Are interventions necessary or even
desirable in class actions? How and when can the scope of the class
litigation be best determined? When, how often, and to whom should
3 For examples of "one way intervention" under prior law, see Union Carbide &
Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961), petition for cert. dismissed, 371
U.S. 801 (1962) ; York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503, 529 (2d Cir. 1944), rev'd
on other grounds, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). Cf. Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851,
856 (3d Cir. 1945).
4 This pragmatic approach to Rule 23 is indicative of more practical considerations
which were introduced by the 1966 amendments to Rules 19 and 24. For example, the
language of Rule 23(b) (1)(B) is very similar to that used in new Rule 19(a) (2)(i),
relating to parties who should be joined in an action, and also to that used in Rule
24(a)(2), pertaining to intervention as of right. The parallel of language reflects the
fact that comparable considerations are involved under all of these rules.
5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2).
See cases cited at notes 2, 3 supra. For a discussion of the extent of judgments in
class actions under former Rule 23, see Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D.
98 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Note].
8 Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 99 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 1194
(1969).
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notice of aspects of the class action be sent? How can settlement of
class actions best be accomplished when agreements among the parties
on the dollar amounts are reached? Can the courts concentrate in one
forum, through the use of new transfer statutes, actions instituted by
class members who have specifically excluded themselves from the
class?
Courts will look to subdivision (d) for illustrative and suggested
means already within their power to meet the challenges of the many
unique problems presented by amended Rule 23. Consequently, these
customary powers take on a far greater significance.
Subdivision (b) sets forth three categories of class actions main-
tainable under revised Rule 23. A 23 (b) (1) class action exists where
the prosecution of individual actions by or against class members (A)
would create inconsistent adjudications with respect to different class
members such that a person opposing the class might find himself obli-
gated to follow incompatible standards of conduct under different court
orders, or conversely (B) would create a risk of adjudications with
respect to individuals which would practically foreclose the interests of
other class members from separate adjudication or, at least, substan-
tially impede the ability of other class members to protect their interests.
A 23 (b) (2) class action may be maintained when the party op-
posing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds applicable to
the entire class, making injunctive or declaratory relief applicable to
the class as a whole appropriate. Finally, a 23 (b) (3) class will be upheld
where the court finds that questions of law or fact common to the class
members predominate over questions peculiar to individual class mem-
bers, and that a class action is superior to other possible methods of
fair adjudication of the controversy. Since class actions brought under
Rule 23 (b) (3) are more common than, and raise most of the com-
plicated problems posed by, classes instituted under Rule 23 (b) (1) or
(2), the discussion here will focus on aspects of 23 (b) (3) unless other-
wise specified.
II. JUDICIAL CONTROL OVER THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Subdivision (d) (1) provides that the court may make appropriate
orders "determining the course of the proceedings or prescribing mea-
sures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation
of evidence or argument."
Many devices are available to the courts to control the adminis-
tration of pretrial issues and discovery matters connected with either
multidistrict or multiparty litigation. The versatility of pretrial con-
ferences provided for in Rule 16 has now been universally recognized
by courts as the framework within which housekeeping and other pro-
cedural orders for complex litigation are determined or scheduled for
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subsequent briefing and argument. The court may order additional
parties to be joined in the action under Rule 19 or may sever parties
under Rule 21. Under the liberal provisions of Rule 20 relating to
permissive joinder of parties, subsection (b) thereof expressly recog-
nizes that the court "may order separate trials or make other orders
to prevent delay or prejudice." Under Rule 54(b) the court has the
power to prevent disruption of the orderly progress of a case involving
multiple parties, where some but not all of the parties have disposed of
the litigation concerning them and the losing party seeks to appeal
therefrom on a piecemeal basis.
In connection with discovery proceedings in complex cases and
in general, the court under Rule 30(b) "may make any ... order which
justice requires to protect the party or witness from annoyance, em-
barrassment or oppression." Although Rule 30 deals with oral deposi-
tions, the court still has plenary power to deal likewise with other
discovery methods since the various rules concerning depositions of
witnesses upon written interrogatories,' interrogatories to partiesl° and
production of documents" are expressly made subject to the provisions
of Rule 30(b).
In the wake of the electrical antitrust cases, the Judicial Coordi-
nating Committee on Multiple Litigation in the United States District
Courts (a subcommittee of the Committee on Trial Practice and Tech-
niques of the Judicial Conference of the United States) was formed to
set up guidelines for the coordination of all such pending litigation. In
those and in several other subsequent cases, this Coordinating Commit-
tee frequently recommended the adoption by the local districts, where
related actions were pending, of standard forms of interrogatories, of
identical Rule 34 production-of-documents requirements with the cre-
ation of central document depositories, of coordinated deposition sched-
ules and of other similar measures."
Subsequently, several of these general recommendations were in-
corporated in an unpublished Outline of Suggested Procedures and
Materials for Pre-trial and Trial of Complex and Multiple Litigation,
which stresses, inter alia, the importance of the early exercise of court
powers to control the course of the litigation."
9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 31.
10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 33.
11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 34.
12 See, e.g., Transcript of Proceedings Before the Coordinating Committee conducted
on March 15, 1968, in connection with certain antitrust actions, Metropolitan Sanitary
Dist. v. Martin Marietta Corp., No. 67 C 684 (N.D. Ill., filed Apr. 26, 1967), and related
cases. On record with Judicial Coordinating Committee on Multidistrict Litigation in the
United States District Courts.
13 See Outline of Suggested Procedures and Materials for Pre-trial and Trial of
Complex and Multiple Litigation 16, 17; see also Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472
(E.D.N.Y. 1968).
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In addition, recently enacted Section 1407 of Title 28 of the
United States Code now permits a Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Lit-
igation to transfer temporarily to one forum, for pretrial discovery
purposes, related cases pending in several districts in order to promote
the convenience of the parties and to accomplish judicial economies.
Other devices for concentrating responsibility for the conduct of plain-
tiff's discovery and other pretrial matters include the designation of
counsel for the class representatives as "lead counsel" and the use of
"steering committees" comprised of counsel for selected parties.
A. Attorneys for Original Parties as Lead Counsel
To avoid conflicting or overlapping and duplicate discovery, the
court should maintain strict control over discovery in a class action and
the class, except upon good cause shown, should have one overall op-
portunity for such discovery just as if it were a single plaintiff. Sim-
ilarly, if orderliness of the litigation is to be maintained and the
burdens on the judiciary kept within reasonable bounds, briefs of the
adversaries should be consolidated wherever practicable and arguments
for each side should be advanced initially by a group spokesman or
lead counsel.
The class plaintiffs and their counsel are the champions of the
common class interests. As stated in Dolgow v. Anderson,14 " [t] he court
must be assured that the representatives [will] put up a real fight'
[citing Chafee, Some Problems of Equity 231 (1950)]." In Mersay v.
First Republic Corp. of America,' the court stated: "The proper in-
quiry is not merely whether plaintiff is a suitable representative, in that
his background and relationships might defeat his recovery, but
whether he will in fact adequately protect class interests."
Since the determination that the "representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class" is a prerequisite
for the validity of a class action," the duty of diligently prose-
cuting the action falls squarely on the shoulders of counsel for the class
plaintiffs. It is significant that former Rule 23(a) spoke in terms of per-
mitting persons "as will fairly insure the adequate representation of
all." 17
 (Emphasis added.) In contrast, the more stringent current Rule
23, which provides for judgments binding on absent members of the
class, speaks in terms of the plaintiff "fairly and adequately protecting
the interests of the class." (Emphasis added.) This deliberate shift in
language, reflecting due process considerations, affirmatively places
obligations of pressing the class litigation on attorneys for the repre-
14 43 F.R.D. 472, 494 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
15 43 F.R.D, 465, 469-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also Hohmann v. Packard Instruments
Co., 399 F.2d 711, 713-14 (7th Cir. 1968).
113 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (4).
17 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 28 U.S.C. App., at 6101 (1964).
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sentative parties acting as lead counsel. Obviously, this procedure
would have to be the rule if no other member of the class expressed an
interest to participate actively in such prosecution.
Thus, there is a sort of natural selection process which points to
original plaintiff's lawyers as lead counsel. There is nothing to prevent
original plaintiff's counsel from sharing or relinquishing most of the
burdens of lead counsel to volunteer counsel for other members of the
class. Indeed, steering and other joint committees and co-liaison coun-
sel are frequently set up among plaintiffs' and defendants' counsel
respectively in multiparty litigation. On the other hand, it seems clear
that since amended Rule 23 places a greater burden on original plain-
tiff's lawyers as lead counsel, it impliedly gives him greater discretion
than counsel for his fellow class members in conducting the suit and
in otherwise carrying out his legal responsibilities. Such greater dis-
cretion is, of course, tempered by correlative obligations to consult with
and obtain the views of interested counsel for other class members on
all significant decisions.
The selection of lead counsel, with due regard to the obligations of
original counsel to protect the interests of the class, is in the province
of counsel for the parties rather than in the province of the judiciary.
The court could permit a change in lead counsel in situations, for ex-
ample, where the original lead counsel finds it necessary to withdraw,
of where he has settled his case. But even under those circumstances,
the parties themselves in a class action should have the initial right to
try to agree on successor lead counsel. In the event of disagreement,
the court should make an appropriate order resolving the matter.
Recognizing the need for such lead counsel as a litigation manage-
ment device in a class action, the court in Fischer v. Kletz" found that
"since June 22, 1965, 'lead counsel' have been in charge of the pend-
ing actions. Despite inevitable minor disagreements along the way, it
is my judgment that this management device has worked satisfactorily
and will continue to do so."
The principle governing control of class litigation by the original
plaintiffs in the face of opposition by one of the intervenor plaintiffs,
was stated by the Ninth Circuit in Schatte v. International Alliance
of Theatrical Stage Employees' 9 as follows:
The general rule in class suits is that the member of the class
who is the original plaintiff retains control over the action as
opposed to other members of the class who may later seek to
intervene. Annotation, 91 A.L.R. 587, 3 INfloore's Federal
Practice § 23.07 n.7. This rule, while not directly applicable
18 41 F.R.D. 377, 385 (S.DN.Y. 1966).
18 183 F.2d 685, 687 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827 (1950).
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here, is based on an underlying principle that where several
parties are joined on the same side of a single case, orderly
procedure requires that decisions be made as to how that side
shall conduct the case even though such decisions may not
accord with the individual desires and opinions of each mem-
ber of the side. Such is the situation here. There being a differ-
ence of opinion concerning the advisability of filing a petition
for rehearing, the opinion of twenty-five plaintiffs, acting
through their attorney, must prevail over the opinion of one
other plaintiff, acting through another attorney.
This rule is certainly a salutary one and probably should be fol-
lowed in the absence of any claim of inadequacy of representation, or
unless a matter peculiar to certain individual class members is involved.
A contrary rule would not only burden the court with duplication of
effort, but might subject the entire class to the hazard of uninformed
action on the part of an intervenor not represented by counsel for the
class plaintiffs.
An adjustment to this rule would seem appropriate in circum-
stances where multidistrict litigation, including one or more class
actions, is transferred to a single district pursuant to Section 1407 of
Title 28 of the United States Code for pretrial discovery purposes. In
such instances, the several sets of counsel for the plaintiffs and defen-
dants respectively should be required to act through steering commit-
tees or through some other agreed upon coordinating procedures pursuant
to a stipulation or a housekeeping order.
B. Effect of Member's Entry of Appearance Through Counsel:
Intervention Compared
Subdivision (c)(2) (C) of Rule 23 provides that "any member who
does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance
through his counsel." Since an entry of appearance does not constitute
an intervention which is expressly referred to in Rule 23 (d), the ques-
tion arises as to how a Rule 23 appearance by counsel differs, if at all,
from a Rule 24 intervention. Questions also arise as to whether such in-
tervensions are necessary or contemplated by Rule 23 for members of the
class, and as to the role which must or can be played in the litigation
by a member whose appearance has been entered.
Upon examination, there is no such concept as a "Rule 23 inter-
venor." There is nothing in Rule 23 which creates or was intended to
create a status of an "intervenor" any different from that accorded to
an intervenor under Rule 24. Anyone seeking to intervene formally in a
class action litigation is presumably required to file a motion under
Rule 24. In lieu of intervention, Rule 23 (c) (2) provides for an entry
of an appearance through counsel by a party desiring to do so.
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It seems clear from the Rule itself that members of a valid class
need not formally intervene. Otherwise the provisions of Rule 23
would be merely duplicative of Rule 24. If there are motions to inter-
vene filed by potential class members in a class action, prior to an ad-
judication as to whether such action. may be maintained as a class
action, such motions probably become moot upon an order of court
upholding the validity of a class encompassing the moving parties.'
A different case arises, however, if it is ultimately decided that the
action may not be maintained as a class action.
It is possible for a potential intervenor in a class action, who files
his motion for intervention prior to the running of the statute of limita-
tions and prior to the upholding of the class itself, to find that the
statute of limitations period expired during the course of the litigation
and that his intervention motion had not been ruled upon. In the event
that the class action decision is reversed on appeal, the potential inter-
venor who was also a class member will certainly wish to rely on the
filing of his motion to intervene at a point at which the statute of limi-
tations should be tolled for him. Although several lower courts have
ruled that the statute of limitations is tolled by the commencement of
a class suit,21 this point has not yet been decided by the United States
Supreme Court. Therefore, it would seem that this person would have
strong equitable and perhaps constitutional grounds for requesting relief
from the bar of the statute of limitations by virtue of his reliance, not-
withstanding the fact of the ultimate reversal of the decision which per-
mitted the class action to be maintained as such in the first instance.
In Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co. 22 the court
stated:
But where the determination is negative, and a class action is,
in the words of the Committee, "stripped of its character as a
class action" (39 F.R.D. at p. 104), it does not necessarily
follow that the case must be treated as if there never was an
action brought on behalf of absent class members.
.. But if the reason for the negative determination stems
from a weighing of various considerations of judicial house-
keeping, it may well be that the decision should not relate
back to the commencement of the action, and that, at the
very least, an opportunity should be presented for proof of
20 Although certain interventions were permitted earlier, the court in Philadelphia
Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., Civil No. 41827 (E.D. Pa., filed Dec. 30, 1966),
determined at a pretrial conference, on May 4, 1967, to hold in abeyance all subsequent
interventions pending decision on the class action.
21 See, e.g., Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 573-74 (D. Minn.
1968) ; Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 460-61 (E.D. Pa.
1968).
22 43 F.R.D. 452, 461 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
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reliance upon the pendency of the purported class action suffi-
cient to toll the statute of limitations. Any other approach
would make it virtually mandatory for every class member to
file a cautionary separate action within the limitations period.
The purpose of Rule 23 is to have the common issues of law and
fact litigated on behalf of the class by the class representatives. Inter-
ventions are not necessary to protect the rights of any class member in
matters which are common to the whole class or to the sub-class to
which such ,party may belong. As the Second Circuit said in Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 23
[w]e are not persuaded that it is essential that any other
members of the class seek to intervene. . . . If we have to
rely on one litigant to assert the rights of a large class then
rely we must. . .
. . . [T]he representative party cannot be said to have an
affirmative duty to demonstrate that the whole or a majority
of the class considers his representation adequate.
What is the signficance, then, of the fact that subdivisions (d) (2)
and (3) expressly give the court discretionary power to permit some
or all of the members "to intervene and present claims or defenses,"
or to place conditions on intervenors, whether they be class members
or not? Upon analysis, such provisions do not require or contemplate
that members fully included in a validly declared class should inter-
vene to present claims or defenseS which are common to the class. In-
terventions for that purpose are unnecessary in class actions since Rule
23 actions can be maintained only as class suits if the representation of
class members is adequate.
There are numerous circumstances when interventions might be
appropriate under amended Rule 23. If the court limits the scope of
the class action because of the necessities of manageability and judicial
housekeeping, it may permit intervention of parties who spe-
cifically seek intervention and who would have been included in the
class except for the limitations imposed by the court.' If the court's
determination under Rule 23(c) (1) is that representation is not ade-
quate, interventions may be permitted as a means of satisfying a condi-
tion to maintaining the action as a class action." Where non-class
members have claims similar to the class, they might be permitted to
intervene to present such claims in order to avoid a multiplicity of law-
33 391 F.2d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 1968).
24 See Philadelphia Elec. Co, v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Pa.
1968).
25 Cf. Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Coop. Assn, 395 F.2d 420, 428-29 (10th
Cir. 1968) ; Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, .391 F.2d 555, 562-64 (2d Cir. 1968).
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suits with potentially conflicting discovery schedules, and to enable such
parties to share the benefits and obligations of the litigation with counsel
for the class members." At the conclusion of the trial on the liability
issues, and subject to due process safeguards for protection of class
members (for example, where the statute of limitations period may have
expired during the course of the trial), the court may disband the class
and permit the separate class members to intervene to present their
individual claims for damages, and their proof as to claims of fraud-
ulent concealment, tolling of the statute of limitations, and other in-
dividualized issues. There are undoubtedly many other circumstances not
illustrated here, where persons may appropriately move under Rule 24
to intervene in class actions.
Rule 23 (d) (3) provides that the court may impose conditions on
intervenors in a class action. "Intervenors" as used in this sub-
division is not limited to class members but applies equally to non-
class members. It is likely that the conditions imposed would be the
same as are imposed on the participation of class members in the law-
suit. Such conditions are authorized by the customary powers of the
court to make all orders deemed appropriate for the orderly conduct
of a multiparty litigation. Undoubtedly these same conditions could be
imposed on an intervenor coming in under Rule 24, or on one who joins
in an action under Rule 19 in a complex case, regardless of whether a
class action also was involved. Rule 23(d) (3), therefore, further recog-
nizes that the court may treat a non-class or pre-class intervenor in the
same manner as it treats a class member who has not excluded himself
from a valid class action. Since the courts may prescribe the limitations
of proof of damages required by intervenors after a decision on the
merits has been reached in a class action which is no longer operative,
this subdivision also encompasses the right of the court to impose con-
ditions on "post-class" intervenors.
Under Rule 23, it is clear that class members are permitted, with-
out intervention or appearance, simply to rely on counsel for the orig-
inal plaintiffs to protect their interests, subject to an obligation to pay
such counsel reasonable expenses and fees in event of a recovery for
their benefit.' This arrangement raises the question whether non-
intervening or nonappearing class members are to be considered as
"parties" to the litigation. Rule 23 (c) (2) (B) makes a judgment in-
volving the class, whether favorable or not, binding on all class mem-
bers who do not "opt out." Unless concepts of res judicata and col-
26 Tranfers to one forum under Section 1407 of Title 28 serve similar purposes. 28
U.S.C.A. § 1407 (Cum. Pocket Part 1968).
27 See, e.g., Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Powell v. Pennsyl-
vania R.R., 267 F.2d 241 (3d Cir. 1959). In the event of no recovery, inactive class
members should not be liable to pay any part of the costs of the litigation which was not
commenced by them,
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lateral estoppel are to be rewritten, it is clear that these members are
parties to the action for the purpose, at least, of being directly in-
cludable in a class judgment. Furthermore, since class members who
have not opted out share certain litigation benefits (for example, freedom
from the requirement of independent compliance with venue require-
ments, and the tolling of the statute of limitations as of the date of the
filing of the class action by the original plaintiffs 28 ), members must also
be considered parties for these purposes. Under Rule 23 (e) class mem-
bers, whether they make an appearance or not, must be given notice of
any dismissal or compromise of the action. Further, apart from the
rules which may be applicable to the original parties, there seems to be
no rule which limits the right to appeal court rulings and decisions to
only those members who enter an appearance. The fact that the court
is administering and supervising the management of a class action will
likely be a factor in court rulings and decisions on motions and re-
quests of individual members, and properly so, but this would be the
case in any multiparty litigation whether in the class action form or
not. Accordingly, class members who have not excluded themselves
may appropriately be deemed parties for all purposes in the litigation
even though they do not enter an appearance. What advantage or effect
is there, then, in entering an appearance through counsel in a Rule 23
action ?
If a party enters such an appearance, an immediate effect is that
court notices, which are otherwise sent to all members directly, will be
sent to counsel appearing for such party. Likewise, subject to local
court rules which may require an appearance through local counsel,
communications from counsel for the class representative to members
of the class would be channelled through members' counsel appearing
of record. This result has the advantage of expediting communi-
cations and decision-making where a class member receiving such com-
munication would otherwise routinely turn it over to his local attorney
for review. A party may desire to enter an appearance to acknowledge
affirmatively, though he is not required to do so under Rule 23, that he
has received notice of the class action and that he wishes to participate
in the fruits of the litigation. This opportunity may be of particular sig-
nificance if notice to the class were made through publication, rather than
individually. Counsel entering an appearance for a class member may re-
quest that his name be placed on the official court mailing or "service" list
of attorneys entitled to receive copies of all papers and orders issued
28 Members, as parties, do not have to satisfy venue requirements independently.
Philadelphia v. Morton Salt Co., 248 F. Supp. 506, 509 (E.D. Pa. 1965). The running of
the statute of limitations is tolled in favor of class members by the commencement of
the class suit. See, e.g., Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 573-74
(D. Minn. 1968) ; Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452,
460-61 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
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by or filed with the court. Probably the entry of an appearance through
counsel does not diminish the basic obligation of counsel for the class
representatives to protect the interests of that member, but such an ap-
pearance may give rise to laches or estoppel principles if there are any
subsequent challenges to the adequacy of such representation. More-
over, timely entry of appearance would not only foreclose any subse-
quent assertion of lack of receipt of notice of the class action, but also
would probably bar any later attack on the proceedings or judgment on
the ground that that member misconceived the legal significance of any
of those proceedings or of the judgment, whether favorable or adverse.
The provisions of Rule 23(c) (2)(C), which permit a member to
enter an appearance if desired, reflect a recognition of basic rights of
parties, for reasons of tactics or preference, to be represented formally
through individual counsel in legal proceedings. Thus viewed, the right
of any class member to enter an appearance through counsel should re-
main unrestricted, even though members who do not enter an appear-
ance are entitled to the same safeguards and due process considerations
as those who do enter an appearance. On the other hand, class mem-
bers by virtue of an entered appearance should not be permitted to dis-
rupt the proceedings or to gain special rights not available to other
members who do not so appear. By not excluding themselves from the
class action after notice has been received, class members must be
deemed to recognize and yield to the need for a unified representative
effort in behalf of all members of the class so that the litigation may
proceed in an orderly fashion. The interests of members of the class in
individual control of the prosecution or defense of separate actions, such
as the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy al-
ready commenced by members of the class, the desirability of concen-
tration of the litigation of the claims in the particular forum, and the
difficulties likely in the management of a class action, will already have
been examined by the court and resolved in favor of the validity of a
Rule 23 (b) (3) class action.
In light of the foregoing, a court should properly assume firm con-
trol over pretrial discovery and other class action procedures, and
restrict the role of counsel for individual members or for intervenors
who seek to conduct such proceedings separately for their individual
clients. Otherwise the evil foreseen by the Second Circuit in Fox v.
Glickman Corp.,2° affirming an order of the district court denying a
stockholder's application for leave to intervene in a class action against
his corporation and its directors, would result. The court observed:
Allowing intervention in a case like this with respect to the
merits, as distinguished from the limited purpose of proving
zo 355 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1965).
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damages, may well result in "accumulating proofs and argu-
ments without assisting the court!' [Citing Allen Calculators,
Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137, 141-42
(1944).]"
As a practical matter, this method of controlling discovery and
other pretrial procedures will not preclude any member from having
counsel of his choice, actively participating in the litigation and sup-
plementing discovery undertaken by counsel for the representative
parties, provided that such member does not engage in undue repetition
or otherwise disrupt the orderly course of the litigation. There is rarely
any problem of this sort that is not resolved by voluntary cooperation
and accommodation among counsel.3 1
C. Mandatory Response to Notice by Class Members
In determining the course of class proceedings, the court may find
it desirable for a variety of reasons to require each class member to file
a statement of intention to prove claims or otherwise to respond
affirmatively on or before a certain date. Such a procedure may be
necessary for ascertaining the identity and addresses of those class
members who will share in any judgment or settlement and for the
"processing [of] the claims of class members prior to the trial for the
purposes of further identification, the designation of sub-classes, if any,
the consideration of all individual problems not reasonably subject to
resolution after verdict and for other purposes."" Early determination
of the scope of the claims of class members also permits the parties
and the court to assess intelligently settlement values for the action.
Courts employing this device have set penalties for a non-responding
member by forever barring its claims," by dismissing its claims with
prejudice," and by excluding such member from the class action.35
The first two sanctions appear extremely harsh when applied to a
class member who did not commence the action, and who, as a result of
3° Id. at 164.
3t Potential rivalry between class members after an initial finding of liability
can be adequately handled since the rule gives a court the power to divide the
class into appropriate sub-classes or to require the members to bring individual
suits for damages. . Even if individual questions arise during the course
of litigation which render the action "unmanageable," the court still has the
power at that time to dismiss the class action and permit the plaintiff to proceed
only on behalf of himself.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 556 (2d Cir. 1968). In so doing, the court
would necessarily have to consider questions of the effect of such an order on the court's
jurisdiction to hear and determine the plaintiff's action standing alone.
32 Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70, 74 (D. Utah 1966).
33 Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 459, 462 (E.D.
Pa, 1968).
34 Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70, 74-75 (D. Utah 1966).
35 Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 577-78 (D. Minn. 1968).
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continued inaction within a court-imposed period of time after notice
of the motion, may be forever barred from suing on claims which
otherwise may still be timely filed. Forever barring, or dismissing with
prejudice, the claims of a non-responding member after a certain date
has the effect of locking a member into a class but closing the door to any
benefits he might derive therefrom. Justification perhaps lies in the
fact that it is simple enough to exclude oneself from the class, after
receipt of the first notice thereof, in order to preserve such rights. A
member who does not so exclude himself must recognize that he be-
comes subject to the jurisdiction of the court, which, subject to due
process limitations, has the traditional powers of imposing sanctions
for failure of any party to comply with the orders or rules of court."
On the other hand, if these sanctions for failure of class members to
make some affirmative response are imposed at a very early stage in
the litigation, they may be challenged as conflicting with the new Rule's
concept that a member is a party to a class action unless he excludes
himself. The chances for success in such a challenge would diminish
greatly if the mandatory response dates were clearly divorced from
the initial period in which class members would be given the oppor-
tunity to exclude themselves. Conceivably such penalties are also sub-
ject, however, to challenges on due process and abuse-of-discretion
grounds under certain circumstances.
The third sanction sometimes used by the courts is exclusion from
the class for failure to respond. It seems, at first blush, to conflict
directly with new Rule 23. Actually, this sanction is more properly
described as an expulsion from the class, since ordinarily the member
being penalized has already been deemed a part of the class earlier
in the litigation. Such an exclusion or expulsion is similar in effect to
the situation under former Rule 23 where a court set a cut-off date
beyond which the class (commenced under former Rule 23(a) (3))
would be closed and no new interventions would be permitted." Such
closing, like the exclusion from the class here, would effectively bar
participation in the class but would not preclude the excluded member
from starting an independent action.
The closing of the class under the former Rule was usually based
on practical considerations facilitating orderliness and manageability
of the litigation. New Rule 23 is no less effective in providing the court
with the power to set a cut-off date for similar reasons. Subdivision
(b) (3)(D) requires a court ruling on a class action to consider, inter
alia, "the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of
343 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 pertaining to consequences for refusal to make dis-
covery, and Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) relating to involuntary dismissal.
37 See Philadelphia v. Morton Salt Co., 385 F.2d 122 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 995 (1968).
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a class action." As discussed earlier, the court may uphold only part
of a class action on grounds of manageability and judicial house-
keeping." Under the provisions of Rule 23 (c) (1), such decision may
be made conditional at the outset or may be altered or amended before
the decision on the merits. In addition, the court under subdivision
(c) (4) may divide the class, initially or later, into subclasses. Since
the court has expressly broad powers to remold the class, recast its
scope, or even terminate it if deemed desirable at later stages of the
litigation, there is ample authority for the court to exclude or expel
non-responding members as of a certain date, by redefinition of the
class in terms of those who have responded. In cases of large classes,
this procedure may afford the court an eminently practical tool for
management of the class. And since it is much less harsh a penalty
than permanently barring a non-responding member, this sanction
would appear to be the preferable one under comparable circumstances.
However desirable this procedure is, care must be taken not to
abuse due process protections. In order to meet due process standards,
it seems that the consequences resulting from a member's failure to
respond affirmatively must be substantial enough to require a timely
response, but not to create a forfeiture of the rights of members who may
have good cause for failure to respond." Excuses for noncompliance may
be minimized and due process protections may be more fully assured by
use of "second notices" warning of the approaching cut-off date,4° and
by the encouragement of communications by counsel for original plain-
tiffs with absent members, prior to such date.
D. Amendment to Pleadings to Eliminate Class Action
Allegations Compared With Dismissal or Compromise of the Action
Subdivision (d) (4) permits an order by the court at any stage
of an action "requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate
therefrom allegations as to representation of absent members and that
the action proceed accordingly." This provision is a specific applica-
tion of the general power of . the court under RuIe 16 relating to pre-
trial procedures, wherein the court may make orders implementing
its decisions with respect to the "necessity or desirability of amend-
ments to the pleadings." An order amending the pleadings to eliminate
class action allegations may be issued by the court, sua sponte, or
may result from a motion by a party under Rule 23, or generally
under Rule 15 which pertains to amended and supplemental pleadings.
Occasions for such an amendment to the pleadings are varied.
38 See Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Pa.
1968).
39 See Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70, 73-75 (D. Utah 1966).
40 See Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., Civil No. 41734 .(E.D. Pa.,
filed Dec. 16, 1966), Class Action Order No. 7, dated Nov. 13, 1968.
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Rule 23 specifically contemplates that a negative determination as to
the class action "means that the action should be stripped of its char-
acter as a class action." 41 This negative determination requiring an
amendment of the pleadings may be made by the court in its initial
deliberation on whether the class action may be maintained as such.
It may also be made after a class has once been sustained, by virtue
of the court's power under Rule 23(c) (1), which provides that "[a]n
order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered
or amended before the decision on the merits."
Even after a determination on the merits, subdivision (d) (4)
would permit an amendment striking the class pleadings or dismissing
the class action and requiring each member to come forward individu-
ally and prove damages. Still another occasion for an order eliminating
class action allegations from the pleadings arises when the original
parties have agreed on a settlement which they wish to consummate
without the participation of , absent class members originally contem-
plated by the complaint.
In all the situations illustrated above, and especially in connec-
tion with a proposed settlement among the original parties, the diffi-
cult and very practical question arises whether such an amendment
to the pleadings constitutes a dismissal or compromise of a class action
within the meaning of Rule 23(e), which requires both the approval
of the court and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise to
be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.
Basic to the entire procedure of new Rule 23, as set forth in sub-
division (c) (1), is the requirement that "[a] s soon as practicable
after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the
court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained."
When read in connection with the Note of the Advisory Committee
on Rules pertaining to subdivision (d) (4), requiring that the plead-
ings be stripped of their class action allegations upon a negative deter-
mination as to the class, it seems to be the clear intention of the Rule
that any such original negative determination does not constitute a
dismissal of the class action within the meaning of Rule 23 (e) so as
to require notice to the alleged members.' It is significant in this
regard that the power of the court to amend the pleadings to eliminate
class allegations under Rule 23 (d) (4) is not made subject to the
provisions of subdivision (e).
On the other hand, once a class action has been upheld and initial
notices to class members have been sent out, the question becomes
largely academic whether a subsequent order amending the pleadings
41 Advisory Not; 39 F.R.D. at 104.
42 Id. See Daugherty v. Ball, 43 F.R.D. 329, 334-36 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
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to delete class action allegations, either before or after a decision on
the merits, is deemed to be a dismissal under Rule 23 (e) requiring
notice to all members. Regardless of the applicability of subdivision (e)
in this situation, due process considerations would dictate that class mem-
bers under Rule 23(b) (3) who received prior notice of the class action
are entitled to receive notice of the elimination of such class under Rule
23 (d) provisions generally. Similarly, even though notice is not re-
quired to be sent out to absent members in a Rule 23 (b) (1) or (2)
class, the same due process considerations may apply if a class were
sustained under those subdivisions and subsequently eliminated.
A more difficult question of notice requirements arises in con-
nection with a settlement among the orginal parties only, which is
reached before any class action decision or notice has been given to
class members. Notice requirements under these circumstances might
raise so serious an obstacle as to destroy the opportunity for a settle-
ment desired by the parties and encouraged by the court in connection
with potentially protracted, complex litigation. 43
Because the facilitation of the voluntary settlement of disputes
not only is a primary objective of the entire judicial system, but also
involves very practical considerations making settlements highly de-
sirable as a general premise, the result should be reached which
furthers this goal with due regard for the constitutional rights of absent
members. It must be remembered that notice to class members of a
dismissal under Rule 23 (e) was principally designed to protect due
process rights of such members. Although not among the illustrative
factors enumerated in Rule 23 (b) (3) as criteria in the determination
of the class action issue, the existence of an immediate settlement
offer among the original parties represents an important and proper
consideration for the court as to whether a class action is superior
to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of
the controversy. Since no notice has yet been sent to class members
at this stage, absent members for the most part are not relying on the
class and thus would not be entitled to notice of the disposition of
that action at such a preliminary stage." Therefore a court could prop-
erly conclude that a class action was not superior to other means for
adjudicating the rights df absent parties, and permit an amendment
of the pleadings to eliminate class allegations. The controversy could
43 This same issue may arise where representative plaintiffs have negotiated a
settlement with defendants before defendants have responded to the complaint. In these
circumstances it is theoretically possible for the plaintiff to amend the complaint as of
right under Rule 15(a) to eliminate the class action allegations. Then court approval of
the settlement is not required under Rule 23(e) since a class action no longer exists, and
the action may be voluntarily dismissed under Rule 41(a). Rule 41(a) otherwise is ex-
pressly made subject to present Rule 23(e), while Rule 15 is not.
44 Cf. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 41 F.R.D. 518 (ED. Pa.
1967).
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then be settled and dismissed without notice to any absent parties.
This procedure fits within the basic outline of Rule 23 procedures,
which, as concluded earlier, permits a court to reach a negative deter-
mination on the maintenance of the class action without deeming that
determination a dismissal of the action under subdivision (e).
III. NOTICE PROCEDURES FOR ASSURING DUE PROCESS
PROTECTIONS FOR CLASS MEMBERS
Class members who will be bound by a judgment are entitled to
all the safeguards of due process." Notice to class members of the
pendency of and significant developments in a class action is the
primary means for affording them due process protection. The Advisory
Committee has commented:
Subdivision (d) (2) does not require notice at any stage,
but rather calls attention to its availability and invokes the
court's discretion. In the degree that there is cohesiveness
or unity in the class and the representation is effective, the
need for notice to the class will tend toward a minimum.
These indicators suggest that notice under subdivision (d) (2)
may be particularly useful and advisable in certain class
actions maintained under subdivision (b) (3), for example,
to permit members of the class to object to the representa-
tion. Indeed, under subdivision (c) (2), notice must be or-
dered, and is not merely discretionary, to give the members
in a subdivision (b) (3) class action an opportunity to secure
exclusion from the class. This mandatory notice pursuant
to subdivision (c) (2), together with any discretionary notice
which the court may find it advisable to give under subdivi-
sion (d) (2), is designed to fulfill requirements of due process
to which the class action procedure is of course subject. See
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). . ."
In addition to subdivision (c) (2), mandatory notice is required under
subdivision (e) upon dismissal or compromise of class actions main-
tained under any section of Rule 23.
Since occasions for sending notice to the class vary, the contents
of each notice should be drafted to meet the demands of the particular
situation. Such notice need not comply with the formalities of service
of process.' Notice given at one stage in the proceedings does not
mean that it must be given at subsequent stages; nor does it neces-
45 See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
46 Advisory Note, 39 F.R.D. at 106-07.
47 Z. Chafee, Some Problems of Equity 230-31 (1950) ; See Brendle v. Smith, 7
F.R.D. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
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sarily mean that notice can be avoided at later stages." As set forth
in subdivision (d) (2), it should be used whenever necessary "for the
protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair con-
duct of the action."
Although not mandatory, notice to class members of the pen-
dency of a Rule 23(b) (1) or (2) class action may be given under
the provisions of subdivision (d) (2). Occasions for sending notice
expressly suggested under Rule 23(d) (2) include notice "to some or
all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent
of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether
they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and
present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action." Other
occasions for sending such notice may be to encourage interventions
to improve the representation of the class; 45
 to poll members on a
proposed modification of a consent decree;" to present claims after
the basic class decision; 61 to file by a certain date statements of inten-
tion to present claims or be "forever barred"; 62 to remind class mem-
bers by a "second notice" of the proximity of a cut-off date for filing
statements of claims;" to identify or make available the identity of
counsel for the class plaintiffs to whom inquiries about the action may
be made by class members; " and in appropriate cases, to notify inter-
ested governmental agencies of the pendency of the action or of
particular steps therein." Even communications with non-members
who might have been excluded from the class definition by virtue of
judicial housekeeping or manageability considerations are compre-
hended under subdivision (d) (2), which provides that notice may be
given for the protection of the members of the class "or otherwise!"55
Subdivision (d) (2) provides that any notice shall be given "in
48 See Class Action Order No. 7, dated Nov. 13, 1968, in Philadelphia Eke. Co. v.
Anaconda Am. Brass Co., Civil No. 41734 (E.D. Pa., filed Dec. 16, 1966), where the court
ordered the sending of a "second notice" to members of the class to remind them that a
cut-off date for filing a Statement of Intention to Prove Claims was fast approaching, after
which the claims of non-responding members would be forever barred.
46 See Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Coop. Ass'n, 395 F.2d 420, 427-29 (3d Cir.
1968).
50 Sec Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683 (1961).
51 See Union Carbide 8: Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 589 (10th Cir. 1961),
petition for cert. dismissed, 371 U.S. 801 (1962) ; Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851,
856 (3d Cir. 1945) ; cf. New York v. Morton Salt Co., 385 F.2d 122 (3d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 995 (1968).
52 See, e.g., Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 462
(E.D. Pa. 1968) ; Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70, 74-75 (D. Utah 1966).
53 Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., Civil No. 41734 (E.D. Pa.,
filed Dec. 16, 1966), Class Action Order No. 7, dated Nov. 13, 1968.
54 Id.
55 Advisory Note, 39 F.R.D. at 107.
56 See Philadelphia. Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 459-60,
462-63 (ED. Pa. 1968).
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such manner as the court may direct." Considerations of the me-
chanics of sending such notices, who should send it, to whom it should
be sent, at whose expense and what should be included therein, have
been generally covered elsewhere in this article with respect to man-
datory notices, and will not be discussed here. Second and later notices
will be governed in large part by similar considerations viewed in the
light of the particular purposes for sending such additional notices.
A. Client Solicitation Considerations
Motions for upholding a class action and giving notice to all class
members are often attacked by parties opposing the class on the ground
that this procedure affords an opportunity for counsel for original
plaintiffs to solicit clients, contrary to the Canons of Professional
Ethics." Since the court has full powers to issue orders restricting
plaintiffs' counsel from initiating any communications with potential
class members, pending a decision on the class action, this contention
should never be a material consideration in the ultimate determination
of the validity of a class action under the criteria set forth in Rule 23.58
Moreover, under the guise of attacks on possible client solicitation,
defendants should not be permitted to interfere with proper commu-
nications between counsel for original plaintiffs and class members in
an action where the court has sustained the class. Once notice has been
sent to members of a Rule 23 (b) (3) class, and especially after the time
for opting out of the litigation has expired, the class plaintiffs and their
counsel are charged with being their brothers' keepers." As shown
earlier, counsel for such class plaintiffs must vigorously prosecute the
action and protect the interests of the class. Class members, who will
be bound by the results of the efforts of class plaintiffs, have the right
under due process protection to have their interests adequately repre-
sented. 6° Conversely, as fiduciaries for the class, counsel for the repre-
sentative parties should be given the opportunity to assure that proper
notices have been timely received and adequately understood, since
they may be called upon to defend claims of inadequate representation
or of improper settlements."
In addition to the principles underlying class representation,
strong public policy considerations in the areas of shareholder suits
and antitrust actions, the most numerous types of class actions insti-
57 ABA Canons of Professional Ethics Nos. 27, 28.
58 See Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am, Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 462 (E.D.
Pa. 1968).
59 Contra, Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 201 F. Sapp. 934, 936 (D. Mass.
1962).
89 See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
61 See Sonnenschein V. Evans, 21 N.Y.2d 563, 236 N.E.2d 846, 289 N.Y.S.2d 609
(1968).
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tuted, encourage lawyers to bring such suits. Lawyers who serve such
interests are to be commended, rather than condemned with insinua-
tions of improper solicitation. As stated in Dolgow v. Anderson:"
In some areas of the law, society is dependent upon
"the initiative of lawyers for the assertion of rights" (Escott
v. Barchris Construction Corp., '340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Drexel & Co. v. Hall, 382 U.S. 816, 86
S. Ct. 37, 15 L. Ed. 2d 63 (1965)) and the maintenance of
desired standards of conduct. The prospect of handsome
compensation is held out as an inducement to encourage
lawyers to bring such suits. See Murphy v. North Ameri-
can Light & Power Co., 33 F. Supp. 567, 571 (S.D.N.Y.
1940). . . ; Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage"
Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 658, 662-63
(1956) ("The value of class actions, albeit reward-inspired,
has been repeatedly established in recent decades by share-
holder's suits") ; cf. Philadelphia Housing Authority v. Ameri-
can Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 29 F. Supp. 540
(E.D. Pa. 1967) (antitrust treble damage action—"The
strong incentive of triple recovery encourages private liti-
gants to vigorously enforce the antitrust laws"). The instant
case presents a classic example of such a lawsuit. Quite ob-
viously, a major incentive to forceful presentation is the
substantial counsel fee plaintiffs' attorney believes he may
be awarded if he is successful.
Accordingly, the court should be especially sensitive to the pro-
tection of the rights of those claimants who are to be affected by the
judgment, once a class action has been sustained. In order to achieve
the objectives of amended Rule 23 and to prevent the revival of one-
way intervention, that is, intervention only when it is to the advantage
of the intervenor, effective notice must be given before any substan-
tive right has been considered or curtailed by the court. In such
circumstances, serious consideration should be given to sending out
notices under the signature of counsel for the class plaintiffs, or at least
to identifying such counsel in the notice." If the court has established
cut-off dates for filing statements of claims or of intention to assert
claims by class members who have not excluded themselves, there
may exist numerous absent members in a large class who never re-
ceived or who misunderstood the earlier notice, or who were relying on
counsel for the class representatives to protect their interests. In
62 43 F.R.D. 472, 494-95 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
63 See Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 577-78 (D. Minn.
1968).
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these or similar circumstances, the court should consider permitting
counsel for the representative parties to initiate communications with
members who have not yet responded. In Hormel v. United States,"
the court stated, "While the Government makes an assertion to the
contrary, I can see nothing wrong about the plaintiffs' circularizing
all others who have similar claims against the government.' To
prevent communication of this kind with such absent members, after
the time for opting out has passed, might well convert the class action
into a "trap" for the unwary," and raises serious first amendment
questions.' Constitutionally defective notice or undue prohibition
against communications with class members carries with it other major
vices. For example, settlement under such circumstances will be made
very difficult since defendants will be concerned about further liability.
In addition, it would cause genuine hardship to all since these questions
probably cannot be raised until after a determination of the action on
the merits.
In light of these considerations, Canon 27 of Professional Ethics,
which prohibits client solicitations, could hardly have been intended
to apply in situations created by class actions which are sustained
under new Rule 23. Accordingly, courts should consider the desir-
ability of liberal communications with absent class members in order
to assure due process rights as well as the "efficient adjudication of
the controversy."
IV. USE OF TRANSFERS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1407 TOGETHER
WITH RULE 23 POWERS TO CONTROL MULTIPLE LITIGATION
Experience under new Rule 23 and Section 1407 of Title 28 of the
United States Code has shown that these two procedures are not alterna-
tive but are in fact supplementary devices for administration of multiple
64 17 F.R.D. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
65 Id. at 304. In stockholder derivative suits, where defendants move to have plain-
tiff post security - for costs, it has been standard practice in certain state courts to permit
the plaintiffs, on cross motion, to obtain an order for the production of a shareholders list
in order to enable the plaintiff to solicit other shareholders to join him as parties plaintiff,
and thereby possibly to obtain the additional amount of stock that would obviate the
necessity of giving security. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Shafstor, Inc., 34 Misc. 2d 658, 229
N.Y.S.2d 927 (Sup. Ct. 1962), aff'd, 19 App. Div. 2d 531, 240 N.Y.S.2d 146, appeal dis-
missed, 13 N.Y.2d 891, 193 N.E.2d 501, 243 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1963). Although some doubt
has been expressed whether a federal court would have jurisdiction in a diversity case
to order such production of the shareholders list, e.g., Neuwirth v. Merin, 267 F. Supp.
333 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), the United States Supreme Court has now expressly upheld such
federal court jurisdiction. Stern v. South Chester Tube Co., 390 U.S. 606, 609-10 (1968).
Accord, unreported opinion in White v. Driscoll, Civil No. 67-98 (S.D.N.Y. April 25,
1968).
66 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 240 F.2d 731, 734 (2d Cir. 1965).
67 See United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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litigation. In the short time since April 29, 1968, when section 1407 be-
came effective, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has on sev-
eral occasions transferred to a single district for discovery purposes
various related, independent and representative actions, particularly
antitrust actions." For uniformity of administration, the forum selected
as the transferee district has full power to render orders relating to the
validity and administration of class actions which have been transferred.
This power to declare and administer classes in the transferee district will
probably withstand challenge, since a class action is a procedural
rather than a jurisdictional device, and since under the express terms
of Rule 23 any order relating thereto may be altered or amended
before the decision on the merits in the transferor district."
When numerous related cases are transferred under section 1407,
it is incumbent upon the transferee court to issue promptly detailed
housekeeping orders to manage the cases transferred." Where such
cases are transferred, the "manageability" factor considered under Rule
23(b) (3) (D) takes on an entirely new perspective. Since transferee
courts are already confronted with the necessity of managing enlarged
litigation under section 1407, there is little additional difficulty en-
countered in administration of transferred class actions. This is espe-
cially so where the transferee forum has the first opportunity to set
the ground rules for such class actions." Upholding and managing
class actions in connection with section 1407 transfers further avoids
a multiplicity of actions 72 and automatically results in coordination
of discovery where certain members "opt out" of the class action. The
need for additional transfer orders whenever new actions are filed
would likewise be minimized if potential plaintiffs are encompassed
within valid class actions. Finally, section 1407 affords an important
68 Reference should be made to the Panel's action regarding antibiotic drugs, pro-
tection devices and equipment, children's books and plumbing fixtures. 5 Trade Reg. Rep.
50,215-18 (1968).
69 The Advisory Committee has declared that one of the main changes wrought
by amended Rule 23 was to provide "that all class actions maintained to the end as
such will result in judgments including those whom the court finds to be members of the
class, whether or not the judgment is favorable to the class. . . ." Advisory Note, 39
F.R.D. at 99. This scheme discourages a multiplicity of actions and eliminates "one way
intervention" for class members.
70 For a good illustration of such a housekeeping order, see Philadelphia Housing
Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Co., Civil No. 41773 (E.D. Pa., filed Dec. 21,
1966), order dated Nov. 14, 1968.
71 See Philadelphia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., Civil No. 68-144 (E.D. Pa., filed Jan. 18,
1968), order dated Jan. 22, 1968, where on the court's own motion, Chief Judge Clary,
in anticipation of multidistrict coordination of antibiotics antitrust litigation, entered a
general stay of all proceedings including class determinations, but excluded from the stay
the filing of responsive pleadings. This and other related antibiotics antitrust actions
pending in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania were ordered transferred to the Southern
District of New York on October 21, 1968. See note 68 supra.
72 Hohmann v. Packard Instruments Co., 399 F.2d 711, 714 (7th Cir. 1968).
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means for reconciling the scope of overlapping class actions com-
menced in different districts."
Rule 23(c) (1) as originally proposed would have permitted the
court in certain circumstances upon its own initiative to convert an
action into a class suit, even where the plaintiff did not choose to
bring a class action. Further, as originally drafted, Rule 23(c) (2)
authorized the court to retain in a 23 (b) (3) class even members who
requested exclusion from the suit, if the court found that their inclu-
sion was essential to the fair and efficient adjudication of the contro-
versy.74
 Because both of these proposals provoked strong controversy,
they were dropped from the final revisions of these subdivisions. These
gaps in court powers to cope with multiple litigation are largely filled
by a judicious combination of section 1407 and Rule 23 powers.
Using these powers in supplementary fashion, a court can sustain a
class action, while at the same time the Judicial Panel could return to
the class forum for pretrial purposes all those who excluded themselves
from the class for one reason or another.
V. CONCLUSION
Essentially, Rule 23(d), providing for orders in the conduct of
class actions, custom tailors to class actions the traditional general
powers of the court under Rule 16 relating to pretrial procedures. Sub-
division (d) also reminds the court that concepts under new Rule 23 give
rise to the need for a careful consideration, at all stages of the action, for
the due process rights of absent class members. Pretrial discovery and
other pretrial matters must be brought under the control and direction
of the court at an early stage in order to avoid predictable chaos in
overlapping and conflicting motions and interrogatories which would
ordinarily ensue if the parties were left to their own devices. Orders
under Rule 23(d) which channel the discovery and pretrial matters
through lead counsel or steering committees consisting of counsel from
each side, and which provide for uniform sets of interrogatories and
documents production requirements, go far to promote a fair and effi-
cient adjudication of the controversy.
New Rule 23 is still in its infancy. It should not be expected to
solve old problems without creating novel ones. Subsection (d) gives
viability to the Rule and affords to the courts a tool for grappling
with the entire range of these unique problems. Subject to constitu-
tional safeguards, the use of the Rule is limited only by the imagina-
tion and creativity of the judge who adjudicates a class action.
73 See Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559 (D. Minn. 1968).
74 See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for
the United States District Courts, 34 F.R.D. 325, 386 (1964).
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